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Toshimitsu (2017) considers an endogenous leader-follower relationship
in the presence of asymmetric network compatibility e®ects. He demonstrates
that there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in endogenous
timing games where a natural Stackelberg situation arises in the market,
and shows that this result depends on the mode of competition and on
the timing of consumer expectations for network sizes. In this note, we
observe that the network compatibility e®ects depend on the types of
compatibility, and that this in turn impacts upon endogenous leadership,
and discuss the implications of the compatibility types.
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
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1. Introduction
By focusing on network compatibility e®ects, Toshimitsu (2017) demon-
strates that a leader-follower relationship endogenously develops among
competing ¯rms in a horizontally di®erentiated product market, based on
the extended game with observable delay developed by Hamilton and Slut-
sky (1990) and Amir and Grilo (1999). In particular, there is a unique
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subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) if there are asymmetric net-
work compatibility e®ects between ¯rms. That is, the ¯rm providing the
product with a larger (smaller) network compatibility e®ect than a cer-
tain level of product substitutability is a leader (follower) under quantity
competition with ex post consumer ful¯lled expectations (Proposition 1).
On the contrary, the opposite holds in the case of price competition with
ex post consumer ful¯lled expectations and of quantity competition with
ex ante consumer ful¯lled expectations (Propositions 2 and 3). In this
note, however, we consider whether these results depend on the types of
compatibility (connectivity).
In general, with respect to ¯rst- and second-mover advantage, a ¯rm
prefers to be a leader (follower) if the strategic relationship between ¯rms
is as a substitute (complement). In particular, it is a dominating strategy
for the ¯rm to move ¯rst if the competing rival ¯rm is strategic substitute,
i.e., the reaction curve is downward sloping. This is the case of a ¯rst-mover
advantage. In contrast, the ¯rm prefers that the competing rival ¯rm take
the ¯rst move if the competing rival ¯rm is a strategic complement, i.e.,
the reaction curve is upward sloping. This is the case of a second mover-
advantage.
In the model of Toshimitsu (2017), the strategic relationship and the
external e®ect on pro¯ts are determined by the e®ects of network compat-
ibility and product substitutability. In turn, the former depends on the
types of compatibility, the timing of consumer expectations for network
sizes, and strategic variables (i.e., quantity and price). In this note, we
focus on the types of compatibility and discuss the economic implications.
2. The Model: Types of Compatibility
Following the same procedure as in Toshimitsu (2017), we consider
duopolistic quantity competition, i.e., Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg games,
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in a market of horizontally di®erentiated products associated with net-
work externalities and compatibilities. Using the framework in Economides
(1996) and HÄackner (2000), we assume a linear inverse demand function
for product i as follows:
pi = A¡ qi ¡ °qj + f(Sei ); i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (1)
where A is the intrinsic market size, qi (qj) is the quantity of ¯rm i(j),
° 2 (0; 1) is the degree of product substitutability, and f(Sei ) is the net-
work externality function of the expected network size for product i, i.e.,
Sei . We also assume that the network externality function is linear, i.e.,
f(Sei ) = aS
e
i , where a 2 (0; 1) is a parameter denoting the degree of net-
work externality.
With respect to the formulation of the expected network size, we focus on
types of compatibility or connectivity between horizontally di®erentiated
products and services. As discussed, we deal with one-way compatibility.
In this case, we present the following two types of partial compatibility:
Formulation in Shy (2001, 2011):
Sei = q
e
i + ®iq
e
j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (2)
where ®i 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; is the degree of product i's compatibility (con-
nectivity) with product j. Equation (2) implies that ¯rm i provides a
compatible product ¯rm j's product can operate. As Shy (2011) points
out, this type can be interpreted as machines and/or software with con-
verters, such that ¯rm i makes the machine compatible with machine j (or
software j). Thus, user i can operate (connect) with product j because
¯rm i helps user i operate product j. For example, ®iq
e
j implies that word
processing software i can convert the ¯les made by software j in such a
way as to operate its software i. However, in this case, we should consider
whether both ¯rms, particularly the rival ¯rm, agree to achieve compati-
bility from a legal viewpoint (e.g., licenses, patents, and other intellectual
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property rights) and technology (e.g., operating systems).
Formulation in Chen and Chen (2011):
Sei = q
e
i + ®jq
e
j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (3)
where ®j 2 [0; 1] ; j = 1; 2; is the degree of product j's compatibility
(connectivity) with product i. Equation (3) implies that ¯rm j provides
a compatible product ¯rm i's product can operate. That is, ®jq
e
j implies
the external part of the expected network sizes for ¯rm i. For example,
we suggest word-processing software. In this case, user i can operate the
¯les made by software j as well as those made by software i. Furthermore,
we postulate the case of an automated teller machine (ATM) network,
comprising both ATMs and bank cards, such that ATMs and bank cards
are complementary products. However, ATMs are also substitutes for one
another, as are di®erent bank cards. That is, customer of Bank i can use
the ATMs of Bank j partially because Bank j helps the customers of Bank
i use its ATMs.
These formulations correspond to the following technology spillover ef-
fects of R&D investment reducing the marginal costs of production.
Formulation in de Bondt and Henriques (1995):
ci = c¡ ki ¡ ¯ikj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j;
where ci is the marginal cost of ¯rm i, c is the initial marginal cost, ki
is the level of R&D investment of ¯rm i, and ¯ikj implies that ¯rm i has
the capability of absorbing the technological knowledge generated by ¯rm
j's R&D investment where ¯i 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; denotes the degree of
absorption. In particular, we assume that a spillover e®ect arises because
the rival ¯rm's R&D stimulates the availability of technological knowledge,
i.e., incoming spillovers.
Formulation in Atallah (2005):
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ci = c¡ ki ¡ ¯jkj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j;
where ¯jkj is the spillover e®ect of ¯rm j's R&D investment. ¯jkj ; implies
the leakage of technological knowledge from the rival ¯rm. In particular,
Atallah (2005) assumes that a spillover e®ect arises from the leakage of
technological information from the rival ¯rm's R&D.
3. Results and Implications
Assuming the formulation in Chen and Chen (2011) for the types of
compatibility in equation (3), we obtain the following results.
Result
Given asymmetric network compatibility e®ects between ¯rms, there is a
unique SPNE in an endogenous timing game, where such a natural Stack-
elberg situation arises:
(1) in the case of quantity competition under ex post consumer ful¯lled
expectations, the ¯rm providing the product with a smaller (larger) network
compatibility e®ect than a certain level of product substitutability is a leader
(follower);
(2) in the case of price competition under ex post consumer ful¯lled ex-
pectations, the ¯rm providing the product with a larger (smaller) network
compatibility e®ect than a certain level of product substitutability is a leader
(follower);
(3) in the case of quantity competition under ex ante consumer ful¯lled
expectations, the ¯rm providing the product with a larger (smaller) network
compatibility e®ect than a certain level of product substitutability is a leader
(follower).
Proof (see Appendices A, B, and C).
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These results lie completely opposite to those in Toshimitsu (2017, Propo-
sitions 1, 2, and 3) as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Endogenous leadership in the case of asymmetric network compatibility e®ects:
1 > a®1 > ° > a®2 ¸ 0: ?
Toshimitsu (2017) This note
Shy (2001, 2011)
Sei = q
e
i + ®iq
e
j ; i; j =
1; 2; i 6= j; where ®i 2
[0; 1] ; i = 1; 2:
Chen and Chen (2011)
Sei = q
e
i + ®jq
e
j ; i; j =
1; 2; i 6= j; where ®j 2
[0; 1] ; j = 1; 2:
Quantity competition
in the ex post consumer
expectation case
Firm 1 (2) is a leader
(follower).
Firm 2 (1) is a leader
(follower).
Price competition in
the ex post consumer
expectation case
Firm 2 (1) is a leader
(follower).
Firm 1 (2) is a leader
(follower).
Quantity competition
in the ex ante con-
sumer expectation case
Firm 2 (1) is a leader
(follower).
Firm 1 (2) is a leader
(follower).
In Results (1) and (2), consumers expect the network size after the
announced quantities; in other words, they believe the quantities. Thus,
the ¯rms know the degree of network compatibility e®ects for each other
before any decision on quantity. In the case of quantity (price) competition,
because the ¯rm knows that the degree of network compatibility e®ects of
the rival ¯rm is su±ciently large (small), the ¯rm commits to deciding the
small amount of quantity (the high level of price) by choosing to move ¯rst.
In Results (1) and (3), where the ¯rms compete on quantity, the timing of
expectations for network sizes di®er, i.e., ex ante vs. ex post. In particular,
in the case of the ex ante expectation, the ¯rms cannot a®ect the expected
network sizes in deciding the quantities. In other words, they know their
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actual network sizes only at the equilibrium. Thus, as is well known,
a ¯rst-mover advantage holds in quantity competition. However, if the
degree of the rival ¯rm's network compatibility e®ect is su±ciently large
at the equilibrium, it is pro¯table for the ¯rm with the smaller network
compatibility e®ects to choose to move second not ¯rst.
Toshimitsu (2017) refers to Belle°amme and Peitz (2010, p. 546), who
identify instant messaging software like AOL Instant Messenger and Yahoo!
Messenger as examples. They argue that \(1) there seems to be early
mover advantage related to the launch of network goods; (2) entrants tend
to favor compatibility, while incumbent ¯rms tend to prefer incompatibil-
ity." If quantity (market share) competition prevails and consumers ex post
expect the network sizes in an instant messaging software market, their
arguments imply that a ¯rm providing the product with small network
compatibility e®ects is a leader (see Result 1). However, even in the case
of quantity competition, if consumers ex ante expect the network sizes,
the opposite arises (see Result 3). Therefore, we investigate what types
of compatibility (connectivity) and timings of consumer expectations for
network sizes are appropriate to products and services in the information
and communication technology industries. Related to the second issue, we
should also reconsider the concept of a ful¯lled expectation equilibrium.
Appendix A
A1. Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria under ex post consumer ex-
pectation
Following the same procedure as Toshimitsu (2017), we derive the Cournot-
Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in the case of ex post consumer ful¯lled ex-
pectation (hereafter, ex post expectation). In view of equations (1) and (3),
because qei = qi and q
e
j = qj , it holds that S
e
i = qi +®jqj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
Thus, the inverse demand function for product i can be revised as follows.
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pi = A¡ (1¡ a)qi ¡ (° ¡ a®j)qj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.1)
Given equation (A.1), we assume that the own-price e®ect exceeds the
cross-price e®ect; i.e.,
dpidqi
 > dpidqj
 ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: In this case, it
follows that 1¡ a > j° ¡ a®j j ; j = 1; 2:
Following Toshimitsu (2017), we also assume that production costs are
zero. Thus, the pro¯t function of ¯rm i is expressed as: ¼i = piqi =
fA¡ qi ¡ °qj + f(Sei )g :
Given the ¯rst-order condition (FOC) of pro¯t maximization, we derive
the following reaction function for ¯rm i:
qi =
A
2(1¡ a) ¡
° ¡ a®j
2(1¡ a)qj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.2)
? Based on equation (A.2), the strategic relationship between the ¯rms
depends on the degrees of the product substitutability and network com-
patibility e®ects:
@qi
@qj
> (<)0, a®j > (<)°; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.3)
? Equation (A.3) implies that a strategic complement (substitute) arises if
the degree of the rival ¯rm's network compatibility e®ects is larger (smaller)
than that of its product substitutability. Taking equation (A.2), we derive
the following Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the case of ex post expectations
(N):
qNi =
f2(1¡ a)¡ (° ¡ a®j)gA
E
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (A.4)
where E ´ 4(1¡ a)2 ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) > 0 and 2(1¡ a)¡ (° ¡ a®j) >
0; j = 1; 2: Using the FOC, the pro¯t in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is
expressed as: ¼Ni = (1¡ a)
 
qNi
2
; i = 1; 2:
We assume that ¯rm j(i) is a leader (follower). Considering equation
(A.2), we derive the Stackelberg equilibrium under the ex post expectation
as follows:
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qLj =
f2(1¡ a)¡ (° ¡ a®i)gA
E ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) ; (A.5)
qFi =
fE ¡ 2(1¡ a)(° ¡ a®j)gA
2(1¡ a)fE ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)g ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.6)
We can similarly obtain the outcomes in the case of the opposite roles, i.e.,
¯rm j(i) is a follower (leader).
A.2 Endogenous leader-follower relationship
Based on equations (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6), with respect to the quan-
tities of ¯rm j in the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we derive
the following relationships:
qLj > (<)q
N
j , (° ¡ a®i)(° ¡ a®j) > (<)0; (A.7)
qFj > (<)q
N
j , a®j > (<)°; (A.8)
qLj > (<)q
F
j , (° ¡ a®i)(° ¡ a®j) > (<)0; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (A.9)
For equation (A.8), if the degree of its own network compatibility e®ect is
larger (smaller) than that of product substitution, the quantity of a follower
in the Stackelberg equilibrium is larger (smaller) than that in Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, for equation (12) in Toshimitsu (2017),
the degree of the rival ¯rm's network compatibility larger than (smaller)
that of product substitution, the quantity of a follower in the Stackelberg
equilibrium is larger (smaller) than that in Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Based on equations (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9), comparing the pro¯ts in the
Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we derive the results as Lemma
A.
Lemma A
(i) If 1 > a®1 > a®2 > °; then q
L
i > q
F
i > q
N
i ; ¼
L
i > ¼
N
i ; and ¼
F
i >
¼Ni ; i = 1; 2:
(ii) If ° > a®1 > a®2 ¸ 0; then qLi > qNi > qFi and ¼Li > ¼Ni > ¼Fi ; i =
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1; 2:
(iii) If 1 > a®1 > ° > a®2 ¸ 0; then qF1 > qN1 > qL1 ; qN2 > qF2 > qL2 ; ¼L1 >
¼N1 ; ¼
F
1 > ¼
N
1 ; and ¼
L
2 > ¼
N
2 > ¼
F
2 :
Proof.1)
With respect to Lemma A (i) and (ii), we obtain the same results in
Lemmas 1 and 2 (i) and (ii) in Toshimitsu (2017). However, with respect
to Lemma A (iii), which contradicts Lemmas 1 and 2 (iii) in Toshimitsu
(2017), if the degree of the network compatibility e®ect of ¯rm 1 (2) is
larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability, ¯rm 1 prefers be-
ing the follower to the leader and to playing a simultaneous-move game,
whereas ¯rm 2 prefers being the leader to the follower and to playing a
simultaneous-move game. In other words, choosing a leader is a dominat-
ing strategy for ¯rm 2, so that ¯rm 1 takes follower. Thus, considering
Theorem V (B) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), the sequential-move game
equilibrium in the extended game with observable delay is unique, i.e., a
Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain Result 1.
Appendix B: The mode of competition
B.1 Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria under ex post consumer ex-
pectation
Taking equation (A.1), we derive the following direct demand function
for product i.
qi =
f(1¡ a)¡ (° ¡ a®j)gA¡ (1¡ a)pi + (° ¡ a®j)pj
(1¡ a)2 ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
(B.1)
In view of equation (B.1), using the FOC of pro¯t maximization, we
1) We can demonstrate the order of the pro¯ts, following the same procedure as in
Appendix 1 in Toshimitsu (2017). For brevity, we omit the proof.
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derive the reaction function for ¯rm i as follows.
pi =
f(1¡ a)¡ (° ¡ a®j)gA
2(1¡ a) +
° ¡ a®j
2(1¡ a)pj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (B.2)
Based on equation (B.2), we obtain the following Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium:
pBNi =
A

2(1¡ a)2 ¡ (1¡ a)(° ¡ a®j)¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)
	
E
;
(B.3)
where 2(1 ¡ a)2 ¡ (1 ¡ a)(° ¡ a®j) ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) > 0 and i; j =
1; 2; i 6= j:
Assuming that ¯rm j(i) is a leader (follower), we derive the Stackelberg
equilibrium in a sequential-move game as follows.
pBLj =
A

2(1¡ a)2 ¡ (1¡ a)(° ¡ a®i)¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)
	
E ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) ; (B.4)
pBFi =
A [(1¡ a)H ¡ (° ¡ a®j)G]
2(1¡ a)fE ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)g ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (B.5)
where H ´ E ¡ 2(° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) > 0 and G ´ E ¡ 2(1 ¡ a)2 > 0.
In this case, we have H ¡G = 2(1¡ a)2 ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)	 > 0 and
1 ¡ a > j° ¡ a®j j ; j = 1; 2. Thus, it follows that pBFi > 0; i = 1; 2. We
similarly obtain the outcomes in the case of the opposing roles, i.e., ¯rm
j(i) is a follower (leader).
B.2 Endogenous leader-follower relationship
Based on equations (B.3), (B.4), and (B.5), with respect to the prices
of ¯rm j in the Bertrand-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we derive the
following relationships:
pBLj > (<)p
BN
j , (° ¡ a®i)(° ¡ a®j) > (<)0; (B.6)
pBFj > (<)p
BN
j , ° > (<)a®j ; (B.7)
pBLj > (<)p
BF
j , (° ¡ a®i)(° ¡ a®j) > (<)0; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (B.8)
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In view of equations (B.6), (B.7), and (B.8), following the same proce-
dure as in the case of quantity competition in Appendix A, we derive the
results as Lemma B.
Lemma B2)
(i) If 1 > a®1 > a®2 > °; then p
BL
i > p
BN
i > p
BF
i and ¼
BL
i > ¼
BN
i >
¼BFi ; i = 1; 2:
(ii) If ° > a®1 > a®2 ¸ 0; then pBLi > pBFi > pBNi ; ¼BLi > ¼BNi ; and
¼BFi > ¼
BN
i ; i = 1; 2:
(iii) If 1 > a®1 > ° > a®2 ¸ 0; then pBN1 > pBF1 > pBL1 ; pBF2 > pBN2 >
pBL2 ; ¼
BL
1 > ¼
BN
1 > ¼
BF
1 ; ¼
BL
2 > ¼
BN
2 ; and ¼
BF
2 > ¼
BN
2 :
Proof (see footnote 1).
With respect to Lemma B (iii), unlike Lemma A (iii), choosing a leader
is a dominating strategy for ¯rm 1, so that ¯rm 2 selects follower. Based
on Theorem V (B) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), the sequential-move
game equilibrium in the extended game with observable delay is unique,
i.e., a Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain Result 2.
Appendix C: The timing of consumer expectations of network size
C.1 Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria under ex ante consumer ex-
pectation
Under the ex ante consumer-ful¯lled expectation, given equation (1),
the FOC of pro¯t maximization of ¯rm i is
@¼i
@qi
= pi ¡ qi = 0: Thus, the
reaction function for ¯rm i is given by:
qi =
A+ f(Sei )
2
¡ °
2
qj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (C.1)
At the ful¯lled-expectation Cournot-Nash equilibrium (FEC ), i.e., qei =
2) See Lemmas 3 and 4 in Toshimitsu (2017).
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qi and q
e
j = qj ; we derive:
qFECi =
f2¡ a¡ (° ¡ a®j)gA
(2¡ a)2 ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2) ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j; (C.2)
where (2¡a)2¡ (°¡a®1)(°¡a®2) > 0 and 2¡a¡ (°¡a®j) > 0; j = 1; 2:
Using the FOC, the pro¯t function of ¯rm i in the equilibrium is ¼FECi = 
qFECi
2
; i = 1; 2:
We now assume ¯rm j(i) is a leader (follower). Given the expected
network sizes, the leader ¯rm j decides its quantity to maximize the pro¯t,
considering the reaction function of ¯rm i, given the expected network size,
i.e., f(Sei ): Thus, the FOC of pro¯t maximization for a leader is given by:
@¼j
@qj
= pj ¡ qj + °
2
2
qj = 0: Using equation (1), we obtain
A¡ 4¡ °
2
2
qj ¡ °qi + f(Sej ) = 0; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (C.3)
In view of equation (C.3), at the ful¯lled-expectation Stackelberg equilib-
rium, i.e., qei = qi and q
e
j = qj ; it holds that S
e
i = qi+®jqj ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j:
Thus, based on equations (C.1) and (C.3), we derive the following Stack-
elberg equilibrium:
qlj =
f2¡ a¡ (° ¡ a®i)gA
(2¡ a)2 ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)¡ (2¡ a)°
2
2
; (C.4)
qfi =
n
2¡ a¡ (° ¡ a®j)¡ °22
o
A
(2¡ a)2 ¡ (° ¡ a®1)(° ¡ a®2)¡ (2¡ a)°
2
2
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (C.5)
We similarly obtain the outcomes in the case of opposing roles, i.e., ¯rm
j(i) is a follower (leader).
C.2 Endogenous leader-follower relationships
Using equations (C.2), (C.4), and (C.5), with respect to the quantities
of ¯rm j in the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria under the ex ante
expectation, we derive the following relationships:
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qlj > q
FEC
j ; (C.6)
qfj > (<)q
FEC
j , a®i > (<)°; (C.7)
qlj > q
f
j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (C.8)
? Taking the FOCs of the leader and follower ¯rms, the prices of the leader
(follower) are expressed as: plj =
2¡ °2
2
qlj and p
f
i = q
f
i : Accordingly, in
view of equations (C.6), (C.7), and (C.8), we derive the following relation-
ships of the pro¯ts in the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as in
Lemma C.
Lemma C3)
(i) ¼lj > ¼
FEC
j ;
(ii) ¼fj > (<)¼
FEC
j , a®i > (<)°:
Equations (C.6), (C.8), and Lemma C (i) demonstrate that the well-
known results held in the case of a quantity-setting game. Furthermore,
as in Lemma C (ii), if the degree of ¯rm i's network compatibility e®ect is
smaller than that of product substitution, ¯rm j chooses a leader. These
cases imply the ¯rst-mover advantage. However, as shown in equations
(C.7) and Lemma C (ii), if the degree of the rival ¯rm i's network com-
patibility e®ect is larger than that of product substitution, the output and
pro¯t of ¯rm j increases compared with those in the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium. This implies that choosing a follower is pro¯table for ¯rm j if the
rival ¯rm i chooses leader, even though the follower's pro¯t is smaller than
the leader's pro¯t.
In the case of asymmetric network compatibility e®ects, i.e., 1 > a®1 >
° > a®2 ¸ 0; based on Lemma C (i) and (ii), we appreciate that choosing
3) See Lemma 5 in Toshimitsu (2017), which treats the case of ¯rm i.
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a leader is a dominating strategy for ¯rm 1, so that ¯rm 2 takes a fol-
lower. Thus, based on Theorem V (B) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990),
the sequential-move game equilibrium in the extended game with observ-
able delay is unique, i.e., a Stackelberg equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain
Result 3.
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